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Silence and the right to justice: Confronting impunity in Spain 
 
Abstract  
 
Silence may play different roles during post-authoritarian and 
transitional periods: in Spain, it has been a key element for impunity. 
Silence was twice imposed to victims: first, after the end of the civil war 
and during dictatorship, silence was a survival strategy to Franco’s 
repressive machinery; later, during the democratic transition, silence was 
said to be the price to pay for reconciliation and democracy. While the 
victims on Franco’s side had reparation, Franco’s victims did not –in fact 
thousands of them still remain buried in unmarked mass graves. Any 
attempts to pursue justice through the Spanish judiciary have been 
unsuccessful, including the resort to the ECtHR. This paper analyses the 
ways in which silence was imposed and the instrumental role the 
repression and its normative regime had on it, and in turn the impact of 
silence on justice. In this context, the role of silence goes beyond 
impacting the individual trauma and shaping a national memory but also 
makes victims unwillingly give up their right to justice. This article 
contends that, when imposed (explicit or implicitly) silence results in 
impunity and courts should take this into consideration when determining 
victims’ effective capacity to claim their rights in judicial fora.  
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Introduction 
Although often referred to as a model of peaceful and negotiated political regime change,1 
the Spanish transition to democracy is actually an experience of silence and choice to 
forget, which has resulted in limited rehabilitation of victims and impunity for 
perpetrators. For many decades, victims have lived under the veil of silence, twice 
imposed to them: first, after the end of the Spanish Civil War and during the dictatorship, 
silence was a survival strategy to Franco’s repressing policies, laws and practices; later, 
during the democratic transition, silence became the price to pay for reconciliation and 
democracy.  
 
It has only been since 2000 that the victims of the civil war and the repression that 
followed, and their relatives have been able to raise such veil of silence and demand truth 
and justice. This has been the result of a process of inquiry both at individual level –
regarding their own families’ history- and at general level –demanding wider historical 
discovery and recognition of events- which was started by the generation of Spaniards 
that did not live through the ‘pact of silence’ of the transition. This mobilisation at civil 
society level let to the opening of a transitional justice debate and demands for 
institutional responses. However, whilst the claims for truth and moral restoration found 
some echo in the approval of the ‘Historical Memory Law’ and other limited measures, 
the door for accountability for human rights violations has remained firmly closed, thus 
preventing the victims to enjoy the right to justice.  
 
                                                          
1 A. Gil Gil, La Justicia de Transición en España. De la Amnistía a la Memoria Histórica 
(Barcelona: Atelier, 2009), 21. 
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Here we argue that difficulties to realize the right to justice for victims of the 
Spanish civil war and dictatorship are largely related to the impact of silence in the 
Spanish society. This article explores the elements of the right to justice as a human rights 
and whether they are present in the Spanish process of confronting the human rights 
violations of the civil war and dictatorship. The following sections provide an overview 
of such violations, analyse the elements of the political transition which led to the 
impunity that continues today and the torturous road to justice through the courts.   
  
The right to justice as a human right  
A judicial system that provides victims of human rights violations with real and effective 
mechanisms to get their rights protected is key to give effect to the State obligation to 
fulfil human rights.2 To grant this is so, international human rights instruments recognize 
the right to judicial protection through an effective remedy3, as well as a set of rights 
regarding the due process. These include the right to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law, minimum procedural 
rights for those charged in a criminal process, and the presumption of innocence.4  
 
                                                          
2 J. Bonet Pérez, ‘La lucha contra la impunidad y sus implicaciones jurídicas internacionales para 
el ejercicio de la justicia transicional’, in Impunidad, derechos humanos y justicia 
transicional, J. Bonet Pérez and R.A. Alija Fernández (Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 
2009), 25. 
3 See arts. 2.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 13 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), 25 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (AmCHR), and 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR). 
4 See arts. 14 ICCPR, 6 ECHR, 8 AmCHR, and 7 AfCHPR. 
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When serious and gross human rights violations have been committed, the right 
to justice becomes critical to avoid impunity. The Updated Set of principles for the 
protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity states that  
 
States shall undertake prompt, thorough, independent and impartial 
investigations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law and take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly 
in the area of criminal justice, by ensuring that those responsible for serious 
crimes under international law are prosecuted, tried and duly punished. 
 
Although the decision to prosecute lies primarily within the 
competence of the State, victims, their families and heirs should be able to 
institute proceedings, on either an individual or a collective basis, particularly 
as parties civiles or as persons conducting private prosecutions in States 
whose law of criminal procedure recognizes these procedures. States should 
guarantee broad legal standing in the judicial process to any wronged party 
and to any person or non-governmental organization having a legitimate 
interest therein.5 
 
From this approach, the right to justice therefore implies a right to access to 
justice, which can be generally understood as ‘the right to a judicial remedy before an 
                                                          
5 UN doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, principle 19: Duties of States with regard 
to the administration of justice. 
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independent court of law’.6 Although criminal proceedings are preferred,7 they may not 
be the only ones suitable to address gross human rights violations. Indeed, in a broader 
sense, the term justice can also include ‘those remedies offered by competent public 
authorities, which are not courts of law but can nevertheless perform a dispute settlement 
function’.8 In any event, it involves a right to a procedure –as Brems puts it-9 that applies 
                                                          
6 F. Francioni, ‘The Rights of Access to Justice under Customary International Law’, in Access 
to Justice as a Human Right, ed. F. Francioni (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4. 
7 The obligation to investigate and to prosecute, try and sentence particularly rises regarding 
violations that constitute crimes according to domestic law and/or international law, e.g. and 
similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment -Article 7 ICCPR-, summary and arbitrary 
killing - Article 6 ICCPR- or enforced disappearances – Articles 7 and 9, and frequently 6, 
ICCPR-. See General Comment No. 31 - The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, Human Rights Committee, Adopted on 29 March 
2004 (2187th meeting), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, para. 18. 
8 Francioni, ‘The Rights of Access to Justice’, 4. See Articles 2(3) ICCP and 13 ECHR. 
Concerning the Spanish case, in 2016 a civil court ordered the exhumation of several corpses 
buried at the so-called ‘Valley of the Fallen’ (Valle de los Caídos), a monumental memorial 
built by Franco to honour the fallen (on his side) during the Civil War and where he himself 
is buried (see Juzgado de Primera Instancia No. 2 of San Lorenzo de El Escorial, Auto No. 
112/16, 30 March 2016). The judge adjudicated in a claim for informations ad perpetuam 
memoriam, a procedure formerly included in the Spanish Civil Procedure Code (Articles 
2002 to 2010, derogated in 2015). The possibility to resort to administrative courts to get 
investigations done concerning enforced disappearances has been explored too in R.A. Alija 
Fernández & E. Calvet Martínez, ‘La exigibilidad en España de los derechos de las víctimas 
de desapariciones forzadas por vía contencioso-administrativa como alternativa a la vía 
penal’, in Desapariciones forzadas, represión política y crímenes del franquismo, ed. C. 
Pérez González and R. Escudero Alday (Madrid: Trotta, 2013), 101-20. 
9 E. Brems, ‘Procedural protection. An examination of procedural safeguards read into substantive 
Convention rights’, in Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of 
Human Rights, ed. E. Brems and J. Gerards  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
140. 
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to investigations into alleged human rights violations and to the availability of remedies 
for claimed victims of human rights violations.10 
 
More specifically, the fulfilment of the right to justice concerning serious 
violations of human rights requires the existence of effective remedies that –as mentioned 
above- provide with means to undertake –mainly ex officio but also ex parte- prompt, 
thorough, independent and impartial investigations, and to prosecute, try and punish the 
alleged perpetrators.11 The failure to conduct investigations into violations of 
fundamental human rights (such as summary and arbitrary executions, torture, or 
enforced disappearance) involves a further violation of the substantive dimension of the 
right to justice.12 The duty to investigate is particularly relevant when the State’s 
responsibility for human rights violations cannot be clearly established.13 Furthermore, it 
limits the effect of the principle of non-retroactivity of human rights treaties regarding 
human rights violations committed before their entry into force, as the investigation ‘is 
required to secure retrospectively the substantive right of the victim’.14 The refusal to 
investigate may also amount to torture or inhumane treatment of relatives in certain 
                                                          
10 Ibid.  
11  Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to 
combat impunity - Report of the independent expert to update the Set of principles to combat 
impunity, Diane Orentlicher: Addendum, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 
2005, principle 19. 
12 See generally A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). 
13 Ibid., 129. 
14 Ibid. 
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circumstances, particularly concerning enforced disappearances.15 Additionally, ensuring 
compliance with the right to justice regarding serious and gross human rights violations 
may also require the State to adopt restrictive measures on certain legal rules, e.g. 
statutory limitations or prescription, amnesties, asylum, extradition, non bis in idem, 
defences (such as due obedience, superior responsibility, official status), effects of 
legislation on disclosure or repentance, jurisdiction of military courts, and the principle 
of the irremovability of judges.16   
 
Two key elements linked to the right to justice are particularly critical in times of 
transition: the proper functioning of the judicial system and the existence of truly effective 
remedies before courts regarding the violations of human rights previously committed.17 
Neither of these can be attributed to the Spanish judicial system with regards to human 
rights violations committed during the civil war and dictatorship that followed. This is 
largely related to the imposition on victims of two consecutive layers of silence regarding 
human rights violations (under Franco’s dictatorship and during the transition to 
democracy), which also had negative effects on their capacity to claim their rights, as we 
will discuss below.  
  
Civil war and dictatorship: silence and official history   
 
                                                          
15 See e.g., Human Rights Committee, Quinteros v. Uruguay, Communication No. 107/1981, 21 
July 1983, para. 14; ECHR, Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, §§ 130-4, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 1998-III.  
16 Updated Set of principles, principles 23-30. 
17 Bonet Pérez, ‘La lucha contra la impunidad’, 26.  
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On 1st April 1939 a civil war which had lasted three years came to an end. It had 
commenced on 17th July 1936, when a military rebellion challenged the legitimate and 
democratically elected government. The dictatorship which followed lasted over 36 years, 
until the death of the dictator, General Francisco Franco, on 20th November 1975. There 
is little agreement among historians about the extent of the human rights and humanitarian 
law violations in the Spanish civil war. Casualty figures vary between 300,000 and 
400,000 dead during the three years of war.18 However, while both sides committed 
atrocities, the repression on Franco’s side was systematic and especially cruel, 
particularly towards the end. As British historian Paul Preston has recorded, on the last 
month of the war, upon the rebel’s victory, 20,000 civilians were executed and many more 
died of starvation and sickness in prisons, concentration and labour camps.19  
 
In the post-war, an overt repressive apparatus and legal system was established in 
Spain.20 A complex normative and institutional web was articulated to dismantle the 
democratic republican legal system –which was branded as subversive- and establish a 
                                                          
18 Preston provides the figures of 300,000 men dead in the war fronts and 200,000 civilian, men 
and women, dead far away from the front. P. Preston, El Holocausto Español. Odio y 
Exterminio en la Guerra Civil y Después (Madrid: Debate, 2011), 17.  More conservative 
estimates calculate 140,000 people killed away from the battlefield during the war and first 
decade of the dictatorship (until 1950), see S. Juliá and others, Victimas de la Guerra Civil 
(Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1999), 411.  
19 Preston, El Holocausto Español, 17. 
20 Aguilar makes this comparison with the dictatorships in the Southern Cone. P. Aguilar, ‘The 
Spanish Amnesty Law of 1977 in Comparative Perspective: From a Law for Democracy to 
a Law for Impunity’, in Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability, ed. F. Lessa 
and L. Payne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 325–35.  
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totalitarian regime. Repression21 included arbitrary arrests and executions, summary trials 
before military judges –with no guarantees and no right to appeal- that routinely imposed 
death sentences, imprisonment in inhumane conditions,22 labour camps,23 abolishment of 
the rights to association, meeting and expression, banning of political parties and trade 
unions, confiscation of properties belonging to pro-Republican groups and organizations, 
and persecution of all manifestations of political, religious and ideological dissidence.24 
The Republic and its sympathisers, civil servants and ordinary citizens that had not 
enthusiastically supported the rebellion were criminalised. On this basis, from 1940 the 
Prosecutor of the Supreme Court was instructed to initiate the ‘General Cause’, to 
prosecute the crimes committed by what they named the ‘red domination’. Through this 
legal and institutional system, the new regime became firmly established in the ‘rule of 
law’.   
 
                                                          
21 The cruellest years were right after the war, in 1939, and during what is commonly referred to 
as the ‘triennium of terror’ (1947-1949). After that period, there were less mass scale human 
rights violations, but persecution and torture was frequent. Towards the end of the regime, 
repression was more localised in regions with strong national identity. 
22 Comisión Interministerial para el estudio de la Situación de las Victimas de la Guerra Civil y 
del Franquismo, Informe General de la Comisión Interministerial para el estudio de la 
Situación de las Victimas de la Guerra Civil y del Franquismo, 28 July 2006, 77, available 
at Todos los Nombres, http://www.todoslosnombres.org/content/materiales/informe-
general-la-comision-interministerial-para-el-estudio-la-situacion-las (accessed September 
10, 2016).   
23 L. Ríos Frutos, B. Martínez Silva, A. García-Rubio, and J. Jiménez, ‘Muertes en Cautiverio en 
el Primer Franquismo: Exhumación del Cementerio del Penal de Valdenoceda (1938-
1943)’, Complutum 19 (2008): 141. The last camp, Los Merinales (Sevilla), closed only in 
1962.  
24 See generally M. Ortiz Heras, ‘Instrumentos legales del terror franquista’, Historia del Presente 
3 (2004): 219. 
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An extensive process of purge reached all state institutions, including public and 
private companies. Whilst 80% of the jobs were reserved for those who had fought on the 
Franco side and friends of the so-called ‘National Movement’, most of the civil servants 
under the Republic were suspended. Of particular interest here was Francoism’s co-option 
of the legal profession by purging anyone considered to be ideologically unreliable and 
only appointing sympathisers as the new judges, prosecutors and court staff.  
 
The first years of Franco’s regime saw an intensive activity of celebration and 
exaltation of those who had died in support of Franco and his rebellion.25 Their bodies 
were located, exhumed, identified and given burial. Their families were given special 
status and reparations schemes. Meanwhile, those killed in battle or assassinated by 
Franco’s troops and his supporters remained in mass graves.26 Their families were not 
only deprived of any sort of compensation but suffered further repression, wherein they 
were marginalised and denied the economic means for a decent life. Many were forced to 
hide their condition as a victim and bury their own identity in silence as a survival 
mechanism. These victims of the civil war that remained ignored or vilified and their 
relatives and those who suffered the latter repression are the victims of our study 
(hereinafter, ‘the victims’).   
                                                          
25 J.M. Tamarit Sumalla, Historical Memory and Criminal Justice in Spain. A Case of Late 
Transitional Justice (Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia, 2013), 42. For initiatives to 
honour the fallen for Franco see L. Castro, ‘El Recuerdo de los Caídos: Una Memoria 
Hemipléjica’, Ebre 38. Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939) 3 (2008): 171-
96. 
26 Gil Gil, La Justicia de Transición en España, 42. In a sinister symbolism of national 
reconciliation at the end of 1950s thousands of bodies of republican victims were taken to 
the Valley of the Fallen.   
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The dictatorship’s repression was based on a manipulation of history, the 
invention of memory and the self-imposed silence and censorship by the war’s losers. 
The war was portrayed by the victors as inevitable given the political instability that 
preceded it during the last years of the II Republic.27 Franco’s regime imposed an official 
discourse over its own victory as a ‘Crusade’ against communism to defend the Western 
Christian civilization.28 The episodes of the war were unequally narrated. The scale of 
Franco´s army´s violations were downgraded and even negated.29 On the contrary, the 
violence of the Republican army was exalted and given much centrality in the accounts 
of the war.30 This narrative sought the imposition of a collective memory of shared guilt 
and the saviour of the nation nature of Franco through symbolic exaltations of the regime 
-monuments, parades, street names, festivities- and indoctrination through school 
textbooks, news and documentaries,31 imposing over the population what Santos Juliá has 
called ‘the rule of memory’.32 A historical and social account of the war as a fratricidal 
                                                          
27 A. Reig Tapia, La cruzada de 1936. Mito y memoria (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2006), 97-104; 
Tamarit Sumalla, Historical Memory, 42-3. 
28 H.R. Southworth, El mito de la cruzada de Franco (Barcelona: DeBolsillo, 2008), 529-530. 
Among others, see an attempt to legally justify the rebellion as a crusade in J. de la C. 
Martínez, ¿Cruzada o rebelión? Estudio histórico-jurídico de la actual guerra de España 
(Zaragoza: Librería General, 1938), 209-10. 
29 Martínez, ¿Cruzada o rebelión?, 209-10. 
30 Historians have demonstrated how the narrative of the episodes of the war provided a bias 
account, based on myths and the manipulation of facts and figures. See generally En el 
Combate por la Historia. La República, la Guerra Civil y el Franquismo, ed. A. Viñas 
(Barcelona: Pasado y Presente, 2012).  
31 A. Reig Tapia, ‘La Pervivencia de los Mitos Franquistas’, in ibid., 909.    
32 S. Juliá, ‘Bajo el Imperio de la Memoria’, Revista de Occidente 302-303 (2006): 7-19.  
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bloodbath was built and maintained throughout the dictatorship and the democratic 
transition. In this context, during the Franco years the defeated resorted to silence as a 
protective measure.  
 
Jo Labanyi has argued that silence was not a consequence of the trauma, as has 
been explored in other post-conflict and post-violence situations, nor a failure of memory, 
but rather a conscious coping strategy chosen by the victims,33 for their own survival and 
the protection of their loved ones.34 In trauma theory, silence is a consequence of an inner 
psychic process responsible for blocking catastrophic event or events’ registration in 
consciousness.35 In this explanation the victim is unable to recall the traumatic event 
voluntarily (as Labanyi describes, ‘this narrative turns survivors of traumatic events into 
victims of psychic processes they cannot control’36), unlike in the case of Spain, where 
survivors chose not to recall. An important consequence of this is what Labanyi calls 
‘habits of silence’.37 In Spain, difficulty to find words to articulate previously untold 
experiences is due to the habits of silence acquired over many years. Silence laid over the 
individual stories of the war losers and covered their collective history, and for four 
                                                          
33 J. Labanyi, ‘The Languages of Silence: Historical Memory, Generational Transmission and 
Witnessing in Contemporary Spain’, Journal of Romance Studies 9 (2009): 24. 
34 See for example the recollection of the forensic anthropologist Francisco Etxebarria, who has 
led many of the exhumations in Spain, on his mother’s silence over her role as a nurse during 
the Civil War to ‘protect him’, in ibid., 23-4. This is a common occurrence in many Spanish 
homes.  
35 As Judith Herman puts it, ‘[t]raumatic memories lack verbal narrative and context’. J. Herman, 
Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 38. 
36 Labanyi, ‘The Languages of Silence’, 24. 
37 Ibid.  
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decades two generations of Spaniards learned to remain silent, whisper and look over 
their shoulder when talking.38  
 
Amnesty and the ‘pact of silence’ during the political transition to democracy 
 
The dictatorial regime established by Franco was, as such, never fully dismantled. His 
death marked the beginning of a transition towards democracy, which implied 
institutions, social structures and people adapted to the new political regime.39 Such 
institutions, structures and individuals in fact continued to rule political and social life 
and occupy the most prominent role in the new democratic system.  
 
Whilst generally considered an example of a peaceful transition, this political 
process was not free from violence.40 As Aguilar has sustained, the Spanish transition 
cannot be understood without the consideration of a climate of persistent political 
violence.41 This, together with the prevailing traumatic memory of the political violence 
that preceded the civil war and the shared guilt over the atrocities which had been 
engraved in the population over forty years of propaganda and manipulation of historical 
                                                          
38 As Ferrándiz points out, ‘The screen of silence, fear and self-censorship has been particularly 
strong in local, rural contexts’. F. Ferrándiz, ‘Cries and Whispers: Exhuming and Narrating 
Defeat in Spain Today’, Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies 9 (2008): 177.  
39 During the transition, the most important rules of the new democratic system were adopted by 
consensus between the Francoist reformist and the moderate groups of the democratic 
opposition (Aguilar, ‘The Spanish Amnesty Law of 1977’, 318). 
40 See figures in Gil Gil, La Justicia de Transición en España, 45. The attempted coup d’état in 
1981 evidences the fragility of the new-born democracy. 
41 Aguilar, ‘The Spanish Amnesty Law of 1977’, 318-22.   
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facts, is instrumental in why democratic stability took precedence over all other 
objectives, including accountability for past crimes.42 The desire for democracy, 
economic development and integration in Europe or, in other words, the determination 
not to dwell on the past but instead ‘to look forward’ played a significant role in the 
adoption of a ‘pact of silence’ over crimes committed by Franco and his regime during 
and after the Civil War.43  
 
Whilst this term of ‘pact of silence’ has been widely used and accepted by many 
authors, it is now becoming contested. Loureiro considers it a poor metaphor and states 
that the notion of a pact of silence calls to mind a conspiratorial vision of a bunch of 
politicians hatching agreements that subsequently have to be made to pervade the 
populace. According to him, such notion is grounded on an old-fashioned concept of 
power as an all-controlling force wielded by an elite, in which the populace is confined 
to a passive or merely reactive role. The transition, however, was characterized by a 
continuous give-and-take between power and resistance, with the many political and 
popular forces in action striving to reach a balance that would satisfy the majority. The 
constant strikes and popular demonstrations that caused a stream of steady concessions 
by Franco’s heirs were precisely one of the transition’s most notable features. To suppose 
that there was a pact of silence, Loureiro considers, is to fail to acknowledge that even a 
totalitarian regime could not have muzzled the politicians of various tendencies, nor the 
                                                          
42 See generally P. Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2002), and P. 
Aguilar, Políticas de la Memoria y Memorias de la Política (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 
2008).  
43 Tamarit Sumalla, Historical Memory, 62. 
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newspapers, independent publishers, novelists, workers, students, graphic artists or any 
other vehicle of public opinion.44  
 
Whether we accept the argument that silence during the transition was a 
consequence of a tacit pact, ‘pact of silence’ or not, the reality is that Spain went through 
a social ‘pact of forgetting’. The relationship between the roles of silence and forgetting45 
is an important element to consider in the Spanish transition. During the debates to 
approve normative instruments to declare amnesty for those incarcerated by the regime 
there were recurrent references to the need to forget the past to focus on the present, by 
all political parties.46 The very first months and years that followed the death of the 
Dictator saw a profuse number of demonstrations, publications and debate on the past, 
the war and its consequences. There was voracity for knowledge and history in the 
population.47 However, the process of approval of the amnesty regulations, concluded by 
the first elected Parliament of the democracy, brought what Juliá has described as the first 
pact of the transition: ‘a pact on the past that, ultimately, prevented it to be used as an 
                                                          
44 Á.G. Loureiro, ‘Pathetic Arguments’, Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies 9 (2008): 225.  
45 We consider that terminology nuances are important in this point. Here we deliberately 
distinguish the use of forgetting and oblivion to highlight the difference between the Spanish 
olvidar as a conscious or unconscious process and olvido as a place where things that have 
been forgotten remain.  
46 See for example the analysis of the political negotiations and normative proposals in S. Juliá, 
Elogio de la Historia en Tiempos de Memoria (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2011), 19-41. In fact, 
Julia demonstrates that the Communist Party had appealed to general amnesties, for winners 
and losers of the war, since 1959, calling for national reconciliation and avoidance of 
revenge.  
47 Ibid., 24-8. 
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instrument in the political fights of the present.’48 Whether we can describe this as a pact 
of silence or a pact to forget is debatable, but ultimately it brought a sidelining of 
legitimate claims for justice, what others have tagged as oblivion or amnesia.49 And these 
-forgetting, silence and ultimately oblivion- led to impunity, as we will argue later. For, 
as far as victims were concerned, this pact involved they would be silent about the crimes 
committed during the Civil War and the Dictatorship by Franco’s regime.             
 
It was during this period of transition that a legal architecture, the cornerstone of 
which is the 1977 Amnesty Law, to provide continued impunity for the crimes committed 
during the civil war as well as during the Franco dictatorship was established. Amnesty’s 
main aim was to benefit those convicted of political crimes because of their opposition to 
Franco’s regime. It had widespread social backing and was overwhelmingly supported 
by the democratic political parties. Amnesty was presented as a milestone in the 
reparation and the rehabilitation process of those punished or discriminated for political 
reasons during the Franco years. In addition, amnesty was justified as a tool to prepare 
the country as a whole for shared life and reconciliation, repairing the wrongs of the past 
and allowing society to forget and concentrate on the future. But the Amnesty Law also 
contained two provisions that effectively guaranteed impunity for the crimes committed 
by Franco’s regime. One disposition established amnesty for the crimes committed by the 
authorities and public order agents when investigating and prosecuting political crimes 
(Article 2.e), whilst the other contained a general clause of amnesty for crimes committed 
                                                          
48 Ibid., 39.  
49 See among many others A. Gil Gil, ‘Spain as an example of total oblivion with partial 
rehabilitation’, in The Role of Courts in Transitional Justice. Voices from Latin America 
and Spain, ed. J. Almqvist & C. Espósito (Routledge: London and New York, 2012), 126.   
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by civil servants and agents of the public order against the enjoyment of human rights 
(Article 2.f.). It is important to note that the Amnesty Law is a pre-constitutional norm -
the Constitution was approved by popular referendum in 1978,-50 which has not only not 
been repealed, but has been repeatedly invoked. While politicians refer to it to appeal to 
a sort of ‘spirit of reconciliation’, the judiciary has used it to prevent any judicial review 
of the thousands of crimes committed during the nearly forty years of repression. This 
has been particularly salient in the latter attempts to search for justice, analysed below.   
 
Few other measures to address the past regime and dismantle its institutional and 
legal architecture were adopted in the early years of the transition. Francoist symbolism 
remained. Restorative measures slowly began in the 1980s, but they were not undertaken 
as part of a comprehensive scheme of reparation, let alone in the framework of a wider 
policy of transitional justice.51 As a direct consequence of the nature of a transition made 
from within, where there was no abrupt ideological or personnel break with the previous 
system,52 there was no institutional reform for the vetting of former public officials in 
                                                          
50 The Amnesty Law was the first law adopted by the first democratically elected parliament and 
the last of the instruments used from 25 November 1975 to provide pardons and amnesty 
for political crimes. The law was approved by the mayority of congress (296 votes in favour, 
18 abstentions, 2 votes opposed and 1 invalid vote, see Congreso de los Diputados, 
Constituent Term, Plenary Session No. 11, 14 October 1977, Diario de Sesiones 24, 974). 
The abstention came from Alianza Popular, the right-wing party mainly composed by those 
who had held important positions during the dictatorship, latter transformed in today´s 
Partido Popular (Aguilar, ‘The Spanish Amnesty Law of 1977’, 318).      
51 For a comprehensive list of legal instruments adopted between 1976 and 1999 establishing these 
and other measures, see Gil Gil, La Justicia de Transición en España, 57-72. 
52 See A. Aragoneses, ‘Continuidad y Discontinuidad del Pasado en la Justicia del Presente’, in 
F. Fernández-Crehuet López and D.J. García López, Derecho, memoria histórica y 
dictaduras (Granada: Comares, Granada, 2009), 61-78. 
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civil and military institutions in influential positions. The exit from public and official 
life of those closer to Franco’s regime was facilitated mainly through a progressive 
succession of early retirements among the military and judicial personnel. More often 
than not, however, political, military and religious elites continued to occupy important 
spheres of public life, including in the army, the police and –most important here- the 
judiciary.  
 
There was little attempt to seek accountability during these first decades of 
democracy. The limited claims for justice were immediately tagged as revanchist 
(motivated by revenge) not only by the right wing parties, but by groups throughout the 
whole political spectrum. The official narrative was that Spanish society overwhelmingly 
backed the forward looking move; however these political decisions had a direct impact 
on victims’ legitimate rights to truth, justice and reparation. Not only were victims never 
consulted, but the democratic pact also sealed some of their options for the exercise of 
such rights. Ultimately, the social pact of silence facilitated democracy at the expense of 
justice, the restoration of rights and dignity of a segment of the population.   
 
Exhumations and the defiance of the silence  
 
It was not until a group of private citizens undertook a series of privately led exhumations- 
‘searching for the dead’- that a process of revisiting the past and defying the silence that 
had surrounded the individual stories of many of the victims of the war started. Since 
then, thousands of bodies have been exhumed, all thanks to the work of private groups 
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and individuals, on occasion at their own expense, and with no official sanction.53 This 
movement is sustained not only by those who directly suffered repression but mainly by 
their grandchildren (born at the end of the dictatorship or early years of the transition), 
who struggle to understand what happened to the lost members of their families, whose 
names and stories were buried in silence while they were growing up. The absence of the 
second generation, or rather their limited role as spectators, is directly related to the 
imposed silence during the dictatorship to which we referred above.54 However, the 
process of opening the graves encouraged victims along with their surviving relatives to 
talk and their grandchildren to listen.55 Thus silence was defied.  
 
                                                          
53 Between 2000 and 2014, over seven thousand exhumations had taken place. See F. Etxeberria, 
Exhumaciones llevadas a cabo en España desde el año 2000 (actualizado diciembre 2014) 
(Universidad del País Vasco, Ministerio de la Presidencia and Sociedad de Ciencias 
Aranzadi, 2004), available at Políticas de la Memoria, 
http://www.politicasdelamemoria.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Exhumaciones-
llevadas-a-cabo-en-Espa%C3%B1a-2000-2014.pdf (accessed September 10, 2016). 
54 Labanyi, ‘The Languages of Silence’, 25. There are of course examples of second-generation 
people (born in the late 1950s) who chose to break the silence that their parents maintained, 
sometimes until their deaths. Labanyi suggests this was done out of a retrospective sense of 
guilt at having done nothing to alleviate their parents’ suffering under the dictatorship. The 
silence of the second generation has received practically no attention from scholars.    
55 The exhumations of mass graves have encouraged victims’ relatives to talk. Ferrándiz has 
suggested that the difficulties that victim’s relatives find in articulating previously untold 
experiences is due not to a blocking or failure of memory, but to the habits of silence 
acquired over so many years. In other cases, people talking for the first time about what they 
suffered in and after the war, the capacity for detail recollection is extraordinary. F. 
Ferrándiz, ‘The Return of Civil War Ghosts: The Ethnography of Exhumations in 
Contemporary Spain’, Anthropology Today 22, no. 3 (2006): 7-12.  
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The reaction of the grandchildren generation against their elders’ silence was 
crucial in igniting and driving a process that started with the search for bodies.56 This so-
called process of ‘recovery of historical memory’57 has been a process of breaking 
through the use of history by Franco’s regime to create an ‘official memory’ about the 
time that preceded the civil war, the conflict and the collective guilt over it reflected in 
the long silence which preceded the transition and was ultimately consolidated by the 
search for amnesty (and, subsequently, amnesia). As argued before, the victims on 
Franco’s side were key to this memory, their worship being a core element to this 
construction.58 Recovering historical memory has also meant attempting to break through 
the pact of silence during the transition, allowing for a new narrative of consensus over 
the generalised choice of silence to settle,59 thus contributing to a renewed process of 
negotiation over a new shared collective memory. Therefore, memory originally appeared 
as a substitute of justice, which in the beginning of this process did not seem a feasible 
option, as we will argue later. However, overall, the claim has drifted to a broader process 
                                                          
56 Labanyi, ‘The Languages of Silence’, 25. 
57As Labanyi noted, this expression is problematic in that it supposes that memory lies buried in 
the past, awaiting ‘disinterment’ (ibid). However, the phrase has caught on; the 
archaeological metaphor is seductive in its promise to offer access to a lost past. It similarly 
suggests that memory bypasses representation by giving us a ‘piece’ of the past, like the 
human remains being recovered.  
58 Castro, ‘El Recuerdo de los Caídos’, 165. Junquera even asserts that historical memory was an 
invention of Franco. N. Junquera, ‘Lo que Ocurre en las Fosas del Franquismo’, in Memoria 
histórica, J.S. Pérez Garzón and E. Manzano Moreno (Madrid: Catarata, 2010), 16-7. 
59 S. Gálvez Biesca, ‘Las víctimas y la batalla por el derecho a la memoria: la Comisión 
interministerial para el estudio de la situación de las víctimas de la Guerra Civil y el 
franquismo’, Mientras tanto 97 (2005): 35-6. 
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of transitional justice that never took place in Spain in a comprehensive way,60 including 
not only the search for truth, but also for justice and reparation.   
 
The beginning of the exhumation process led to an intensification of political 
pressure to open public debate over the past that ultimately materialised in the 2007 Law 
for the recognition and broadening of rights and establishment of measures in favor of 
those who suffered persecution or violence during the civil war and the Dictatorship,61 
also known as the Ley de Memoria Histórica (Historical Memory Law, hereinafter HML). 
Thirty years after the transition, the HML is firmly grounded on the consensus to look 
forward narrative -in its own wording, in the spirit of reconciliation and concord that had 
inspired the transition.62 In spite of the ambitious set of aims directed both to victims and 
the wider citizenship laid out in its preamble, its text and the institutional responses have 
fallen short. The measures are not based on the recognition of the existence of violations 
of human rights, but rather on some kind of compensatory or equating mechanism.63 The 
                                                          
60 J. Álvarez Junco, ‘La memoria histórica española’, X Cursos de Derechos Humanos de 
Donostia-San Sebastián (2009): 44-5; M. Capellá i Roig, ‘La recuperación de la memoria 
histórica desde la perspectiva jurídica e internacional’, Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar 
7 (2008): 273-9. 
61 Ley 52/2007 por la que se reconocen y amplían derechos y se establecen medidas en favor de 
quienes padecieron persecución o violencia durante la guerra civil y la dictadura, 26 
December 2007. 
62 HML, Preamble. 
63 Gil Gil, La Justicia de Transición en España, 97; J. Chinchón Álvarez, ‘El Viaje a Ninguna 
Parte: Memoria, Leyes, Historia y Olvido Sobre la Guerra Civil y el Pasado Autoritario de 
España. Un Examen desde el Derecho Internacional’, Revista del Instituto Interamericano 
de Derechos Humanos 45 (2007): 181-3.  
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law does not attempt to restore the victims’ right to justice nor to confront the residual 
presence of the imposed memory.  
 
In terms of justice –an absent idea in the HML-,64 it merely rejects the legitimacy 
both of courts, juries and other criminal or administrative bodies established during the 
Civil War in order to sentence or penalise persons on political, ideological or religious 
belief grounds, and their decisions.65 Sentences and fines passed on political, ideological 
or belief grounds by courts or criminal and administrative bodies during the Dictatorship 
against those defending the previous regime or the reestablishment of democracy, or 
following a way of life in accordance with current constitutional rights are similarly 
declared illegitimate, a claim still sought by the victims. But it does not declare such 
decisions illegal or null and void. By the same token, it implicitly endorses the Amnesty 
Law by not declaring it repealed. Therefore, it maintains the rule of impunity and the lack 
of officially-sponsored investigation of the facts. Accountability is not to be expected 
under its umbrella.  
 
Instead, the possibility to make justice as a core element of transition to 
democracy has been abandoned to focus on the so-called ‘historical memory’. 
Nevertheless, in terms of truth and memory, it just seeks to promote recuperation of the 
personal memory of those who suffered persecution and violence. With a timid 
acknowledgement of the victims’ and their relatives’ right to remember and recover their 
                                                          
64 In Druliolle’s opinion, ‘[t]he lack of reference to the idea of justice, not simply reparation, is 
[…] striking’. V. Druliolle, ‘Recovering Historical Memory: A Struggle against Silence and 
Forgetting? The Politics of Victimhood in Spain’, International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 9, no. 2 (2015): 326.  
65 Article 3.1 HML.  
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story, the state merely guarantees a right to talk without shame and fear, which they had 
not openly enjoyed until now. However, it does not ensure that their stories enter the 
public domain in order to confront Francoist historical memory nor the official discourse 
of reconciliation built during the Transition. No officially-endorsed truth commission or 
report concerning the events in the civil war and under Franco’s ruling is considered. No 
public policy on memory is designed, either.  
 
“What do they want? For us to wait 75 more years?” 
 
In the above-described context, it is not surprising that victims tried to find a public forum 
to tell their stories. They attempted to use the courtroom as a space to defy silence. In 
2006 claims reached the Juzgado Central de Instrucción (Central Investigating Court) of 
the national court Audiencia Nacional, including that of the Platform of Victims of 
Enforced Disappearances by Francoism, which demanded a judicial investigation of the 
thousands of enforced disappearances.  
 
In 2008 Central Investigating Judge, Baltasar Garzón, accepted his jurisdiction 
over alleged crimes, which included illegal detention without news of fate (enforced 
disappearances) committed in the context of crimes against humanity between 1936 and 
1951.66 The judicial decision explicitly established that the inexistence of persons direct 
or indirectly responsible for the crimes does not prevent the need to provide victims with 
                                                          
66 Juzgado Central de Instrucción No. 5, Audiencia Nacional, Diligencias Previas Proc. Abreviado 
399/2006 V, Auto, 16 October 2008.     
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protection.67 Judge Garzón’s ruling established that exhumations were outside the 
competence of his central court, but instead required the cooperation of the courts with 
territorial jurisdiction over the places where graves were located. Consequently, the 
decision ordered the opening of necessary legal procedures to satisfy the claimants’ 
demands to find each ‘disappeared’ listed in the claim. While some local courts assumed 
the delegated competence to order the exhumations at local level, most refused to do so 
on the basis of either the Amnesty Law or the applicability of statutory limitations to the 
alleged crimes.  
 
The recourse to the courts evidences a desperate attempt for victims to exercise 
their right to justice in order to seek truth, institutional support in their search for their 
relatives and an official endorsement of their attempts to challenge the imposed version 
of events through the courts. No material reparation (besides the restitution of the remains 
to the families) was sought. Neither was individual criminal accountability.68 On the 
                                                          
67 Ibid., section XIII. The decision names a series of high-level perpetrators, including Franco, as 
responsible for the crimes, and demands the public authorities to provide death certificates 
to certify the extinction of individual criminal responsibility.   
68 J. Chinchón Álvarez, ‘Examen del Auto del Juzgado de Instrucción Nº. 5 de la Audiencia 
Nacional por el que se acepta la competencia para investigar los crímenes contra la 
humanidad cometidos en la Guerra Civil y el franquismo’, La Ley 5 (2008), 1388. 
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contrary, both in the judicial claims69 and in Judge Garzón’s ruling70 there was a clear 
intention to relinquish such accountability. Ultimately, the search for truth drove forward 
a search for justice. A justice that did not seem feasible up to that point, preventing victims 
from resorting to the judiciary, for a number of reasons that we will argue lately. 
 
Judge Garzon’s decision was acclaimed by victims but met with fierce criticism 
from the right wing of the political spectrum, including many in the judiciary. In 2008, 
after the General Prosecutor appealed Judge Garzon’s ruling, the Criminal Chamber of 
the Audiencia Nacional ruled the court incompetent to continue the case and closed the 
judicial avenue for victims.71 Following this, two right wing organisations initiated legal 
proceedings in the Supreme Court against Garzon, accusing him that by assuming 
jurisdiction over the disappearances he had knowingly issued an unjust decision. This is 
a crime under the Spanish Criminal Code.72 Both claims were later dismissed. Although 
                                                          
69 Later, during the trial against Garzón (see later in this section), victims’ relatives would declare 
that, even knowing who had perpetrated the crimes, all they wanted was to recuperate their 
relatives’ remains. See e.g., their statements in M. Batallas, ‘Dos víctimas de Franco 
subrayan ante el Supremo que su objetivo es recuperar a sus familiares’, El Periódico, 
February 13, 2012, http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/politica/tribunal-supremo-
comienza-oir-testimonio-victimas-franco-1375261, and N. Junquera, ‘Sé hasta la matrícula 
del verdugo. Lo que quiero es a mi madre’, El País, February 6, 2012,  
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/02/06/actualidad/1328554737_164022.html.  
70 The direct perpetrators were not identified and individualised. Only Franco and the members 
of his government and other public institutions – all dead - were named responsible for the 
crimes under investigation. 
71 Audiencia Nacional, Pleno de la Sala de lo Penal, Procedimiento ordinario No. 53/08 del 
Juzgado Central de Instrucción No. 5, Expediente 34/08, Auto, 2 December 2008. 
72 The Supreme Court decision to accept jurisdiction over the claims has been severely criticised 
at political level but also considered unsustainable from a legal point of view, see J. 
Chinchón and L. Vicente, ‘La investigación de los crímenes cometidos en la guerra civil y 
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the Supreme Court established that the Judge was not criminally responsible, it insisted 
that Garzón had acted wrongly, as the Amnesty Law and the rules on prescription 
govern.73 Ironically, the only opportunity that victims have had to have their voices heard 
before a court in the judicial process against Garzon. On 1st February 2012, Maria Martin, 
81 years old at the time, was the first victim to declare before the Supreme Court. After 
declaring on the disappearance of her mother she declared to the media that she was still 
waiting for her to be exhumed and if she could she would have digged her up with her 
own nails. She asked “What do they want? For us to wait 75 more years?”74. 
  
The path to justice closed at the domestic level, the victims resorted to the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR). Nonetheless, the result was 
equally deceiving. In 2012, a chamber of the ECtHR adopted an inadmissibility decision 
in the first case discussed therein, Antonio Gutiérrez Dorado and Carmen Dorado Ortiz 
against Spain.75 The applicants, Antonio Gutiérrez Dorado and Carmen Dorado Ortiz 
(who died in 2010, before the decision was issued), were grandson and daughter 
respectively to Luis Dorado Luque, a Member of the Spanish Parliament belonging to the 
socialist party that had been forcibly taken away on 18 July 1936 by military forces in 
                                                          
el Franquismo como delito de prevaricación. Análisis crítico del auto del Tribunal Supremo 
de 3 de Febrero de 2010 desde la perspectiva del derecho internacional’, Revista Electrónica 
de Estudios Internacionales 19 (2010): 1-42. 
73 Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal, Sentencia No. 101/2012, 27 February 2012, legal ground 
6, para. 3. 
74 Obituary. Maria Martin, una ancina ante las togas, El Pais, 26 July 2014. Maria Martin died 
at the age of 83, still waiting for her mother’s body to be exhumed from the mass grave 
where she lies. [author’s translation] 
75 ECtHR (3rd Section), Antonio Gutierrez Dorado and Carmen Dorado Ortiz v. Spain, 
Application no. 30141/09, Decision, 27 March 2012. 
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circumstances that have not yet been fully established. The applicants had no reliable 
information as to their relative’s fate after 28 July 1936. In early August 1936 the body 
of a person who according to the autopsy had died as a result of firearm injuries with 
serious wounds to the brain and liver was discovered with documents with Dorado 
Luque’s name in his pockets. Initially registered as Dorado Luque in the civil registry, 
some days later the judge decided that there was not enough evidence regarding his 
identity, so they made a new entry in the civil registry was made stating the body was that 
of an ‘unknown man’. In 1981 her widow initiated a procedure for ‘voluntary declaration 
of death,’ which would entitle her to widow’s benefits. In 1993 a court confirmed that Mr 
Dorado Luque had disappeared and that his fate and whereabouts were unknown and 
ordered that his death (established on 30 July 1936) be recorded in the civil registry books. 
In May 2006 Carmen Dorado brought a criminal complaint that was dismissed on the 
basis of statutory limitations. The appeal court and the Constitutional Court confirmed 
the initial decision. Ms Dorado was among the applicants which, in December 2006, filed 
the complaint before the Audiencia Nacional, on which the decision on lack of 
jurisdiction was issued in 2008.  
 
In their application before the ECtHR, the applicants - Antonio Gutiérrez Dorado 
and Carmen Dorado Ortiz -invoked Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture, and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 8 (right 
to private and family life) and 13 (right for an effective remedy before national authorities 
for violations of rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. Focusing on 
the enforced disappearance of Mr. Dorado Luque, the ECtHR considered that the 
applicants had waited too long before bringing their application. According to the Court, 
they should have introduced their complaints without undue delay once it had become 
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apparent that the mechanisms provided by the State no longer offered ‘any realistic hope 
of progress in either finding the body or accounting for the fate of their missing relative 
in the near future’.76 Thus, based on a very strict application of the principle of due 
diligence in reaching the court, the ECtHR declared  the complaint inadmissible. The 
Court did not take into consideration how the specific social circumstances and, very 
centrally the veil of silence and legacy of the repression, had determined the victims’ 
behaviour, limiting their agency and ultimately their capacity of diligence.  
 
The Impact of Silence on the Right to Justice in Spain 
 
Silence, both as a surviving strategy and a transitional pact, has had a negative impact on 
Franco victims’ right to justice. In the Spanish case, both dimensions intertwine and 
gather, and have ultimately resulted in systematic lack of accountability and impunity for 
crimes committed during the civil war and the dictatorship. 
 
As a surviving strategy, silence is indeed disempowering. Martínez de Bringas 
has sustained –referring to memory- that the time of repression and silence plays against 
the time of memory. The time of the victim is never the time of the repression, in fact 
there is an inversely proportional relation among them.77 The same applies when 
considering justice. Martínez de Bringas continues saying that ‘what gets destroyed with 
spasmodic brevity is difficult to reconstruct with the circumstantial and utilitarian 
                                                          
76 Ibid., para. 39. 
77 A. Martínez de Bringas, ‘De la ausencia de recuerdos y otros olvidos intencionados. Una lectura 
política de los secuestros de la memoria’, in El Derecho a la Memoria, ed. F. Gómez Isa 
(Bilbao: Universidad de Deusto, 2006), 269. [author’s translation] 
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allocations of postmodern democracies’.78 An additional element to take into 
consideration is the incapacity and inexperience of ‘the repressed’ to be activate 
democratic processes.79 Forty years of dictatorship is too long a time for a population to 
be quickly trained in a democratic modus operandi and to have a culture of democracy 
overnight. Furthermore, exile, repression and victimisation pose obstacles to the 
processes that lead to equality and justice. 
   
Even when victims finally felt empowered once silence was symbolically broken 
through the exhumation processes, structural obstacles remained, anchored on the 
transitional pact founded on victims’ silence. Regarding the existence of a proper judicial 
system as a key element to ensure the right to justice, the lack of vetting and institutional 
reform of the judiciary during the transition made the courts hostile and ultimately 
inaccessible to any justice demand.80 This is particularly true regarding the judges sitting 
at the Supreme Court. As Aragoneses has shown, judges that had been loyal to Franco’s 
regime kept their positions in the higher ordinary tribunal in Spain, in opposition to the 
Constitutional Court, an extraordinary judicial body created by the 1978 Constitution.81 
                                                          
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid.  
80 As Aguilar sustains ‘[t]he existence of a very conservative judiciary in Spain is crucial to 
understand a key obstacle to truth and justice’. Aguilar, ‘The Spanish Amnesty Law of 
1977’, 331. For a detailed account of the lack of reform and obstructionism of the judiciary 
see C. Jiménez Villarejo and A. Doñate Martín, Jueces, pero parciales. La pervivencia del 
franquismo en el poder judicial (Barcelona: Pasado y Presente, 2012).  
81 A. Aragoneses, ‘El Derecho Bajo el Franquismo. Transformaciones del Sistema Jurídico 
Español (1936-1978)’, in Represión política, justicia y reparación. La memoria histórica en 
perspectiva jurídica (1936-2008), co-ord. M. Capellà and D. Ginard (Palma: Plural, 2009), 
123-59.  
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The continuation of most of the judiciary is a consequence of the transitional pact, which 
effectively traded the maintenance of many of the old structures for amnesty for political 
crimes and a constitutional regime. 
 
As far as the existence of truly effective remedies before courts, the current ones 
are in no way effective. The continuous invocation of the Amnesty Law as well as 
statutory limitations to dismiss claims regarding crimes committed under Franco’s rule 
demonstrate the limitations of the system. This is particularly true when it comes to 
enforced disappearances, a serious violation of human rights of a permanent character 
until the fate of the disappeared person is established. Therefore, in international law no 
statutory limitations apply before that moment. Instead, Spanish courts systematically 
take for granted that the disappeared are dead, without further investigation, thus violating 
fundamental human rights. 
 
Turning back to the Amnesty Law, two points need to be highlighted. First, 
amnesty, as already mentioned, principally covered acts committed with a political 
intention. Only those that had been punished for political crimes benefited from the 
amnesty. Other victims that did not qualify as political criminals -such as the relatives of 
those executed during the Civil War and the Dictatorship or other groups persecuted for 
social reason, e.g. homosexuals- were not to expect any acknowledgment of their 
victimhood because of the amnesty. In general, nor were any victim of crimes committed 
by Franco’s public forces (e.g. torture, rape), as public officers also benefitted from 
amnesty. Instead, Franco’s victims were expected to contribute to the transitional pact by 
remaining silent and forgetting. Otherwise said, the imposition of silence. Not accepting 
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this part of the pact, meant risking accusations of wanting revenge and obstructing the 
political path to democracy.  
 
Secondly, the fact that the 1977 Amnesty Law is a pre-constitutional norm. The 
1978 Constitution includes a broad set of fundamental rights –among them, the right to 
effective judicial protection- in line with international standards on human rights, as well 
as a general repealing provision. According to it, ‘any provisions contrary to those 
contained in the Constitution are […] repealed’.82 A law limiting the right to effective 
judicial protection should, easily, be considered unconstitutional. Therefore, at any point 
any court facing the potential application of the Amnesty Law could simply decide not to 
apply it for that reason. Instead, Spanish courts have kept considering it as fully in force.  
 
However, the impact of the pact of silence on the quest for justice regarding crimes 
committed under Franco’s rule has allegedly been much more far-reaching than the 
Amnesty Law itself, at least until 2000. This argument is supported by the Enrique Ruano 
case, the only case of police brutality during the dictatorship tried up to date. It involved 
the torture and murder of Enrique Ruano, a student and member of an opposing political 
group, when he was under police custody in 1969. His family got his case re-opened in 
1994. Although in 1996 the alleged perpetrators were acquitted due to lack of evidence –
allegedly manipulated by the police-, they sat in the dock without the Amnesty Law being 
applied; nor did the Supreme Court mentioned it when it confirmed the acquittal in 1997. 
This case shows that the invocation of the Amnesty Law is a recent trend, as courts did 
not consider it in the 90’s. At the same time, one should wonder why if Ruano’s relatives 
                                                          
82 Spanish Constitution, Repeals, para. 3. 
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succeeded in having the case re-opened (news that the national media widely reported on 
at that time), no other families attempted to follow the same path. Possibly, many felt that 
it was too late for that and there was no hope, as the ECtHR would put it. It is a fact too 
that they did not attempt to reach international human rights courts. However, the 
eagerness to bring criminal complaints in mid-2000 points in a different direction. By that 
time, the crimes victims had suffered were no longer a taboo. Therefore, there are obvious 
indications that the pact of silence, the prevailing fear and lack of empowerment of 
victims all contributed to the lack of attempts to seek justice through courts. 
 
In fact, it is symptomatic that efforts to get justice done have not stopped in recent 
years. On the contrary, victims are looking for other fora where to achieve their goal. The 
most remarkable one was the complaint filed in 2010 in Argentina by several victims of 
crimes committed since the beginning of the Civil War until the first democratic elections 
in 1977 (including enforced disappearances and tortures).83 The goal now is still to seek 
truth, but also justice and accountability.84 The Argentinian judge admitted the complaint 
and, although Spain has so far refused to extradite the alleged perpetrators, her decisions 
have already had an important effect: on the 19th January 2016 took place the opening of 
the first mass grave under the authorisation of a Spanish judge, following a request of 
                                                          
83 Querella 4591/2010, nominada ‘N.N. por genocidio y/o crímenes de lesa humanidad cometidos 
en España por la dictadura franquista entre el 17 de julio de 1936, comienzo del golpe cívico 
militar, y el 15 de junio de 1977, fecha de celebración de las primeras elecciones 
democráticas’. 
84 C. Slepoy, ‘Querella argentina. Una historia de ida y vuelta’, Coordinadora estatal de apoyo a 
la Querella Argentina contra crímenes del franquismo, http://www.ceaqua.org/querella-
argentina/ (accessed September 10, 2016). Carlos Slepoy is the legal representative of the 
victims that have filled the complaint. 
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international cooperation issued by the Argentinian judge. This could be the beginning of 
a process where the quest for justice finally provides also with truth. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The transitional experience in Spain shows how strongly silence (whether explicit or 
implicitly imposed) can affect victims’ right to justice as expected in a mature democracy, 
leading to an obvious result: impunity. Silence about Franco’s crimes was first adopted 
by victims as a strategy to survive in a regime that built a memory of the events where 
they had no place. Attempts to contest the official version of the Civil War and oppose 
the dictatorial regime would result in repression and further victimisation. Silence was 
therefore their only way to resist four decades of dictatorship without further damage. 
The transitional process in the late 70s imposed them a second layer of silence, insofar 
they did not get public spaces to tell their stories and have their suffering acknowledge. 
On the contrary, the pact to forget and move forward forged at the political level to 
facilitate a fresh start of the new democratic era became a pact of silence. Amnesty was 
granted to political crimes, but also to public agents who had committed gross violations 
of human rights. The victims, far away from being political criminals, had to accept not 
putting forward their claims for justice. The Amnesty Law sacrificed their rights to 
justice, truth and reparation for the sake of political stability. They got nothing in 
exchange, and had yet to learn to use a the tools provided by democracy, except that even 
then they faced a judicial system which was largely a continuation of Franco’s courts 
which would not provide effective remedies against past human rights violations. 
Altogether, forty years of silence, the transitional pact, amnesty, fear and 
disempowerment refrained the victims from making their claims. The turning point came 
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in the 2000s, when the third generation (grandchildren, grandnephews and grandnieces), 
feeling the urge to know the details about their relatives’ fate and to restore their stories 
into the collective memory, started opening the mass graves where the latter were buried. 
Through private initiatives, victims’ associations (literally) disinterred the past and drew 
back the veil of silence over Franco’s crimes.  
 
In an attempt to find a public forum to tell their stories and seek the truth, victims 
resorted to courts, but it was fruitless. Both at domestic courts and at the ECHR have their 
claims been dismissed. Remarkably enough, the latter has based its decision not to admit 
complaints regarding Franco’s crimes on the lack of diligence of victims, without even 
considering their lack of agency brought about by decades of imposed silence and 
repression. This deserves strong criticism. Courts should take into consideration the 
impact of such contextual elements on victims’ real capacity to claim their rights, if they 
are to provide fora to effectively fight against impunity.  
 
Nevertheless, what in the beginning was a truth-seeking strategy has become a 
justice-seeking process. Aware of the fact that the Spanish judicial system lacks key 
elements to guarantee their right to justice, namely the proper functioning of the judicial 
system and the existence of truly effective remedies before courts, they brought a claim 
before an Argentinian court in order to get crimes investigated and punished. 
Paradoxically, the first effect of this new attempt has been a bit of truth, finally unburied 
from a mass grave. 
 
